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Whitepaper · v0.1·welfare floor·open to refutation

An optimism.fun request for startups

Climate change

Decarbonize the global economy fast enough to limit warming, while keeping energy cheap and abundant.

Published

2026-06-09

Authors

optimism.fun

Status

Draft · v0.1

License

CC BY 4.0

§0weekly drop · week 1

Editor’s drop

Published 2026-08-20 · optimism.fun

blackpaper · the problem

37.4 billion tonnes of CO2 were emitted from fossil fuels in 2023, the highest figure ever recorded, and still rising (Global Carbon Project, 2024). This is not a story where the trend has turned; global fossil emissions climbed from 22.7 billion tonnes in 1990 to 25.5 billion in 2000, 33.1 billion in 2010, and 37.4 billion in 2023, a near-monotonic increase across three and a half decades of climate summits, treaties, and public commitments (Our World in Data / Global Carbon Project). Every human alive, all 8.2 billion, is exposed to the downstream physical consequences: shifting precipitation, more frequent extreme heat, sea-level rise, and disruption to the crop yields and water systems several billion people depend on directly (IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report, 2023). The economic exposure is real but genuinely contested in size: integrated-assessment models put long-run GDP at risk anywhere from single digits to over 20% under high-warming scenarios, a wide enough range that any single number should be treated as illustrative, not precise (range across IPCC AR6 WG2 and macro-climate literature). What is not contested is the cost of the energy transition itself. The IEA's 2023 Net Zero Roadmap update states that limiting warming to 1.5°C requires global clean-energy investment to rise from $1.8 trillion in 2023 to roughly $4.5 trillion a year by the early 2030s (IEA, Net Zero Roadmap, 2023 update). That gap, roughly $2.7 trillion a year of investment that needs to materialize and currently does not, is the single largest number in this entire index: it dwarfs annual global venture capital investment (~$300-400 billion, PitchBook/NVCA, most years) by nearly an order of magnitude. The optimistic half of this problem is not hypothetical. Solar photovoltaic module prices fell about 90% between 2010 and 2020, and utility-scale solar and onshore wind are now the cheapest form of new electricity generation in most of the world on a levelized-cost basis (Our World in Data, "Cheap Renewables Growth," drawing on IRENA and Lazard LCOE data). Power generation, the largest single emissions source, has a solved cost curve; the problem there is now deployment speed, grid integration, and permitting, not physics or economics. The frontier that remains genuinely hard, where emissions are rising fastest relative to available fixes, is concentrated in a short list: industrial heat and cement and steel production (accounting for roughly a fifth of global CO2 emissions combined, IEA), long-haul aviation and shipping, and durable carbon removal at gigatonne scale, a technology that barely exists commercially today. These are not solved by the same cost curve that won for solar and batteries; they require new industrial chemistry, new fuels, or direct removal technology that current global capacity, under 1 million tonnes/year of durable removal against a need for gigatonnes (CDR.fyi, 2024 tracking), is nowhere close to matching.

whitepaper · the proposal

The framing that wins here is abundance, not sacrifice, because the physics genuinely support it: the same clean, firm, cheap power that displaces fossil emissions also lowers the cost of everything built on top of energy, food, water desalination, industrial goods, computation. That is not a rhetorical stance, it is the observed empirical result of the last decade of cost curves (Our World in Data / IRENA / Lazard LCOE series), and it is why the buildable version of this problem looks like an industrial and infrastructure program, not a behavior-change campaign. What actually has to be built, in order of where the marginal dollar is most underdeployed relative to what's proven: (1) grid-scale transmission and storage to move already-cheap renewable power to where demand actually is, since interconnection queues in the US alone exceed 2 terawatts of stalled capacity (Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, Queued Up 2024 report), a bottleneck that is regulatory and permitting, not technical; (2) clean firm power, advanced geothermal, next-generation nuclear, long-duration storage, to cover the hours renewables cannot; (3) industrial heat and feedstock decarbonization for cement, steel, and chemicals, where the IEA estimates roughly 20% of global emissions sit and where electrification, green hydrogen, and novel chemistry (electrochemical cement, direct-reduced-iron with green hydrogen) are technically demonstrated but not yet cost-competitive at scale; and (4) durable carbon removal, direct air capture and mineralization, which needs roughly a thousand-fold capacity increase from today's sub-million-tonne base to matter at a gigatonne scale (CDR.fyi tracking, IPCC removal-pathway estimates). The why-now is straightforward and dateable: solar and battery costs cleared the threshold where clean power beats fossil power on unsubsidized cost in most of the world sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s (IRENA, Lazard). That was the hard, decade-long part. What remains is capital deployment and permitting speed, both of which are policy and financing problems with known playbooks (streamlined interconnection queues, transmission permitting reform, first-of-a-kind project finance for industrial decarbonization), not open scientific questions. The dollar figure, worked directly from the IEA's own numbers: the Net Zero Roadmap update states $1.8 trillion was invested in clean energy globally in 2023, and this needs to reach approximately $4.5 trillion a year by the early 2030s to stay on a 1.5°C-consistent path (IEA, 2023 Net Zero Roadmap update). That is not a projection of what the market will naturally do; the IEA is explicit that current trajectories fall well short, particularly outside China, where investment in emerging and developing economies would need to rise roughly sevenfold from current levels to hit the pathway. The addressable gap, current $1.8T minus required $4.5T, is roughly $2.7 trillion a year of investment that has to be mobilized and currently is not: new project finance structures, sovereign and multilateral risk-sharing instruments, and de-risked vehicles for the emerging-market half of this gap, where private capital is currently unwilling to go without a public backstop. Confidence note: the $1.8T and $4.5T figures are IEA modeled estimates under a specific 1.5°C-consistent pathway, not measured historical facts, so treat them as high-confidence directional numbers (the gap is real and roughly this size) rather than a precise target to hit exactly. The severity-of-GDP-at-risk figure in the underlying problem entry is explicitly low-confidence, reflecting genuine, unresolved disagreement in the economics literature about long-run climate damage functions; anyone building here should treat the physical risk case as directionally strong and the specific dollar-damage numbers as contested. What is not contested is that $2.7 trillion a year of underdeployed clean-energy capital, mostly locked out by permitting queues, financing structures, and emerging-market risk premia rather than by unproven technology, is one of the largest single investable gaps identified anywhere in this index.
§1abstract

The four-axis ranking

We rank humanity’s most important problems on four quantifiable dimensions — quantity of humans affected, severity per person, current solution quality, and addressable market size — and package each as a proposal in the spirit of Musk’s Hyperloop Alpha. This document is the proposal for climate change. Every number below is sourced and tagged with confidence. Every ranking is a conjecture, open to refutation.

Quantity · humans affected

8.2B

high

Severity · 0–1

unknown

Market size · TAM

$4.5T

med
§2problem statement

What we are trying to solve

Climate change is a problem of getting clean energy and industry cheaper than the dirty incumbents, fast. The optimistic case is strong: solar, wind, and batteries have fallen ~90% in cost in a decade and are now the cheapest power in history. Emissions are still rising, so the work is real, but the frontier is concrete: industrial heat, cement, steel, aviation, and durable carbon removal. The framing here is not sacrifice, it is abundance: the same cheap clean energy that limits warming also lifts living standards.

§3why it persists

The gap between the world and the world that is physically possible

§4existing alternatives

Who is already working on this

No companies have yet been tagged to this problem in the dataset. If you know one, open a PR.

§5proposed direction

If we solve this, here is the world we get

Section in progress

The success vision and technical proposal for this problem are still being drafted. Unpublished sections stay empty. A Monday newsletter is not promised. Subscribe to get the upgrade, or contribute on GitHub.

§6cost & scale

What the market can pay

The world is already paying $4.5T per year against this problem (IEA Net Zero Roadmap (2023 update) — required annual clean-energy investment by the early 2030s to stay on a 1.5C-consistent path, up from $1.8T invested in 2023; med confidence).

A successful solution does not need to capture more — it needs to redirect a meaningful slice of existing spend, plus the latent willingness-to-pay implied by the severity score above. The cost ceiling for a real solution is bounded by this number; everything cheaper is dominated, everything more expensive is a non-starter.

§7safety & considerations

What could go wrong, and how we know we are not wrong

Section in progress

Failure modes, ethical considerations, and the conditions under which this whitepaper would be falsified are being authored as the weekly cadence ships. The Deutschian commitment: every claim above is a conjecture; we publish the conditions under which we would update. Unpublished sections stay empty. A Monday newsletter is not promised. Subscribe to get the upgrade, or contribute on GitHub.

§8suggested investors

Who would back this

Section in progress

No capital allocators have yet been tagged to this problem in the dataset. Unpublished sections stay empty. A Monday newsletter is not promised. Subscribe to get the upgrade, or contribute on GitHub.

§9sources & criticism invite

Where this is wrong, tell us

Every number on this page carries a source and a confidence tag. Every section open to refutation. If a citation is wrong, a number is stale, or a conjecture is unfounded — file a correction.

corrections → use the feedback widget in the nav · open issue at github.com/adamtpang/optimism.fun

Published whitepapers

One problem.Published essays, not a Monday promise.

The essays that exist are listed at /whitepapers. A new essay is not promised every Monday. Weeks with no essay are empty on purpose. Nothing here invents a back catalog.

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